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Abstract 
Hamilton identifies 1973 to 1996 as “the age of OPEC” and 1997 to the present as “a new 
industrial age.” During 1974-1996 growth in non-OPEC oil production Granger causes 
growth in OPEC oil production. OPEC oil production decreases significantly with positive 
shocks to non-OPEC oil production in the earlier period, but does not do so in the “new 
industrial age”. In the “new industrial age” OPEC oil production rises significantly with an 
increase in oil prices, unlike during “the age of OPEC” period. OPEC oil production responds 
significantly to positive innovations in global GDP throughout. Over 1997:Q1-2012:Q4 the 
negative effect on real oil price of positive shocks to non-OPEC oil production is larger in 
absolute value than that of positive shocks to OPEC oil production. The cumulative effects of 
structural shocks to non-OPEC oil production and to real oil price on OPEC oil production 
are large. The cumulative effects of structural shocks to OPEC production and real oil price 
on non-OPEC production are small. Results are robust to changes in model specification. An 
econometric technique to predict growth in OPEC oil production provides support for the 
results from the SVAR analysis. Results are consistent with important changes in the global 
oil market. 
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OPEC and non-OPEC oil production and the global economy  
1.Introduction 
Hamilton (2013) identifies five main periods associated with significant changes in 
the price of oil; 1859-1899, 1900-1945, 1946-1972, 1973-1996 and 1997-present. Hamilton 
(2013) describes the latter two periods as “The age of OPEC” and “A new industrial age”, 
respectively. Hamilton associates the “The age of OPEC” with the move to a higher average 
real oil price, the change in the focus of the global oil market from North America to the 
Persian Gulf, and with assertive behaviour by OPEC. “A new industrial age” is connected 
with the tremendous economic growth in the major emerging economies, particularly China 
and India. Hamilton (2013) notes that the recently industrialized economies have absorbed 
over two-thirds of the increase in world oil consumption since 1998 and that this pattern of 
absorption of oil resources is likely to continue into the future. Kilian and Hicks (2013) show 
that rapid growth in emerging economies drove the rise in real oil price over 2003-2008. 
In this paper we model the behaviour of real oil price and OPEC and non-OPEC 
production behaviour during the “The age of OPEC” from 1973 to 1996 and “A new 
industrial age” from 1997 to the present. The behaviour of the two types of producers has 
been differentiated in the literature and their behaviour has changed over time. Dées et al. 
(2007) report policy simulations indicating that non-OPEC production is inelastic to changes 
in price and that OPEC decisions about production impact oil prices. Barros et al. (2011) find 
that shocks affecting the structure of OPEC oil production are highly persistent. Kaufmann et 
al. (2008) finds that real prices generally have a positive effect on production by OPEC 
members.
1
 Lin (2009) identifies 1990-2006 to be a time of a largely competitive oil market, 
                                                          
1
 Analysis of OPEC behaviour has focused on models of production for oil producers. Lin (2009) provides a 
review of work on the world oil market based on optimal non-renewable resource extraction models. Huntington 
(1994) shows that intertemporal optimization models did not function as well predicting the world oil market as 
recursive simulation models. Ramcharran (2002) estimates a negative and significant price elasticity of supply 
for OPEC. Kaufmann et al. (2004) find that OPEC influences real oil prices and that models not allowing for the 
endogeneity of oil price cannot provide tests of competing models of production behaviour. Gately (2007) 
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with the periods 1973-1981 and 1981-1990 having the market strongly influenced by OPEC. 
Huppmann and Holz (2012) argue that there has been a change in behaviour in the crude oil 
market since 2008 with OPEC having less market power, in contrast to before 2008 when 
Saudi Arabia acted as Stackelberg leader with a non-cooperative OPEC. Kolodzeij and 
Kaufmann (2014) argue that failure to model OPEC and non-OPEC oil production separately 
(and to just focus on aggregate global oil production) will lead to underestimation of the 
influence of supply shocks on real oil prices. 
An increase in economic growth in developing countries may be associated with a 
higher expected growth for commodity demand than an increase in growth in developed 
countries. Radetzki (2006) finds that growth in emerging market countries is associated with 
a relatively greater usage of commodities than in expansion in developed economies.
2
 
Roberts and Rush (2010) report that commodity resources are used relatively intensively in 
traded goods and that growth in trade is a driving force in the growth of developing countries. 
Developing Asia grew at an average annual pace of 8.5% over the period between 2003 and 
2013. The IMF expects developed economies to grow 2.2% in 2014 and developing 
economies to grow at almost 6% in 2014.
3
 
In this paper we estimate the interrelationship between OPEC oil production, non-
OPEC production, global aggregate demand and real oil price with a structural VAR model. 
Results are consistent with fundamental and related changes in the global oil market, based 
on strong global demand maintaining real oil price at high levels over most of 1997:Q1-
2012:Q4, a steady upward trend in non-OPEC oil production over the last forty years, and a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
observes that in discussing OPEC oil output relative to non-OPEC output in the composition of global oil 
production it is important to recognized that oil consumption in OPEC countries is rising rapidly. Gately et al. 
(2013) point out that OPEC′s domestic oil consumption has risen steeply since the 1970s and that collectively in 
recent years OPEC oil consumption approaches that of China. 
2
 Radetzki (2006) finds that a dollar added to the GDP in developing Asian countries uses more than twice the 
quantity of commodities as does a dollar added to the GDP in OECD countries. Ratti and Vespignani (2013a) 
find that liquidity growth in China has a significant effect on crude oil price over 1997-2011. 
3
IMF Global Prospects and Polices can be found at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/  
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change in the behaviour of OPEC from reacting to non-OPEC oil production to responding to 
higher real oil price. 
We find that growth in OPEC oil production moves to offset growth in non-OPEC 
production during 1974:Q1-1996:Q4, but not during 1997:Q1-2012:Q4. Growth in OPEC oil 
production is not influenced by oil price during 1974:Q1-1996:Q4, but is during 1997:Q1-
2012:Q4. Growth in non-OPEC oil production responds significantly to positive innovations 
in real oil price over 1974:Q1-1996:Q4. Growth in Non-OPEC oil production does not 
respond significantly to positive innovations in real oil price over 1997:Q1-2012:Q4, possibly 
because real oil price during this period is above a threshold required for non-OPEC to 
maximize production
4
. Over 1997:Q1-2012:Q4 the negative effect on real oil price of 
positive shocks to growth in non-OPEC oil production is larger in absolute value than that to 
positive shocks to growth in OPEC oil production. Previously (over 1974:Q1-1996:Q4) 
growth in non-OPEC production didn’t have a statistically significant effect on real oil price 
(due to offsetting OPEC adjustments). 
Shocks to growth in OPEC oil production make large cumulative contribution to real 
oil price. Shocks to growth in non-OPEC oil production do not. The cumulative contribution 
to growth in OPEC oil production of real price shocks is large whereas that of growth in non-
OPEC oil production is small. There is a large cumulative contribution to growth in OPEC oil 
production of shocks to growth in non-OPEC oil production, but that the reverse does not 
hold. The effect of shocks to growth in non-OPEC oil production on cumulative growth in 
OPEC oil production is larger over 1974-1996 than over 1997-2012. 
Using an econometric technique to predict growth in OPEC oil production, developed 
by Lewellen (2004) and Westerlund and Narayan (2012), we find support for the results from 
the SVAR analysis. During the first period, growth in OPEC oil production can be predicted 
                                                          
4
 Ghalib (2004) estimates that among non-OPEC producers, the price ranges from a low of $12 for Norway to a 
high of more than $35 for Mexico that they require to balance the current account of their balance of payments. 
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by growth in non-OPEC oil production and global GDP growth, while during the second 
period growth in OPEC oil production can be predicted by growth in oil prices and global 
GDP growth. This evidence confirms Hamilton (2013)’s view of OPEC moving to a more 
market-orientated strategy from 1997. 
The behaviour of OPEC oil production, non-OPEC oil production and real oil prices 
is discussed in Section 2. The econometric model, data and variables are presented in Section 
3. Section 4 contains the empirical results. Section 5 considers robustness of results to 
changes in identification strategy, change in variables from real to nominal and variation in 
lag structure. In section 6 the predicted power of non-OPEC production, global aggregate 
demand and real oil price on OPEC oil production is examined. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Oil prices, and OPEC and non-OPEC oil production 
The behaviour of OPEC and Non-OPEC oil production over 1974 to 2012 is shown in 
Figure 1a and within OPEC oil production of Saudi Arabian oil production in Figure 1b. 
Nominal and real oil price is shown in Figure 2. The nominal and real oil price in U.S. dollars 
based on an index of 100 in 1974:Q4. Striking features in Figures 1a and 1b are the falls in 
OPEC oil production and Saudi oil production from the end of the 1970s through the first half 
of the 1980s. This is due to several factors, some more transitory than others. During the 
Iranian revolution, oil production fell between November 1978 and June 1979 by about 2.0-
2.5 million barrels per day of oil. This reduction was mostly reversed shortly after the 
revolution. The onset of the Iran-Iraq War in September 1980 caused a further major fall in 
the output of both countries.  
During the losses in oil production through the Iranian revolution and Iran-Iraq War, 
the nominal price of crude oil went from $14 in 1978 to $35 per barrel in 1981. The high oil 
prices in the 1970s lead to increased investment in production by non-OPEC countries, which 
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resulted in ongoing increases in production well into the 1980s even after oil prices, subsided 
in real terms. OPEC reacted to lower real prices and increased production by non-OPEC 
countries by trying to restrict production with quotas over 1982 to 1985. Up until early 1986, 
Saudi Arabia cut production in an attempt to offset the fact that many OPEC countries 
exceeded agreed production restrictions, after which time Saudi production rose 
substantially.
5
 This behaviour in Saudi oil production is illustrated in Figure 1b. 
In 1990 oil price rose sharply with Iraqi’s invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War that 
followed. With the first Gulf War in 1990:8, oil production collapsed in Iraq and Kuwait. Oil 
production by Saudi Arabia increased sharply to partially (and substantially) offset this 
collapse. Oil production in Kuwait had recovered by early 1993. Oil production in Iraq 
remained relatively stable until the end of the 1990s.The price cycle then turned up. Growth 
in Asia over 1990 to 1997 contributed to world oil consumption and oil price increases. Non-
OPEC oil production fell in the early 1990’s attendant on a major decline in Russian 
production between 1990 and 1996. 
The recovery from Asian financial crisis resulted in world petroleum consumption 
growth from 1999 onwards until the onset of recession in the U.S. beginning in March of 
2001. In 2003 there was political unrest in Venezuelan and the second Persian Gulf War. The 
rapid increase in oil price leading to a peak in June 2008 is associated with rapid economic 
growth in major emerging economies, particularly China and India, and with low spare 
production capacity.
6
 The fall in oil price from July 2008 to January 2009 is related to the 
global financial crisis during late 2008, recession in the U.S. over December 2007 to June 
                                                          
5
 Cairns and Calfucura (2012) argue that Saudi Arabia's objective is to set oil production to moderate oil prices 
so as to preserve a market for oil in the long run. Alkhathlan et al. (2014) also note that Saudi Arabia’s intention 
is the stability of OPEC and the global oil market and that they will increase oil production to offset negative oil 
supply shocks. 
6
 Hamilton (2013) notes that contributing factors to stagnation of oil production overall over 2002-2008 includes 
instability in Iraq and Nigeria, reduced production in the North Sea and by Mexico and Indonesia, and Saudi 
production being lower in 2007 than in 2005. Kaufmann (2011) attributes the sharp rise in oil price in 2007-
2008 to flat non-OPEC oil production combined with exhaustion of OPEC spare capacity to increase oil 
production in the face of strong demand. Hamilton (2013) and WTRG Economics (2014) provide authoritative 
reviews of oil shocks and oil price behaviour for an extended period. 
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2009, and weak growth in Europe. Also OPEC decreased production target from September 
2008 to January 2009. Concurrent with the global financial crisis and the weak global 
economy the spot price for crude oil remains subdued before re-bounding by April 2011 
while the global economic activity remains subdued.
7
  
 
3. Literature Review on structural breaks in oil prices 
The paper contributes to the structural break literature on oil prices by determining the 
characteristics of different periods such as “the age of OPEC” and “a new industrial age”. 
Consideration of structural breaks in the behaviour of oil price goes back at least to Hamilton 
(1983) with recognition of a OPEC induced sharp rise in oil price in 1973.
8
 The recognition 
of structural breaks in oil prices can influence conclusions concerning the time series 
properties of the oil price data. If the existence of structural breaks is not correctly taken into 
account, inaccurate conclusions may be arrived at concerning the times series properties of 
the data. This is an important issue in that if oil prices are stationary there is mean reversion, 
but if oil prices have a unit root then shocks have permanent effects. Pindyck (1999) and 
Ferreira et al. (2005) do not allow for structural breaks and conclude that oil prices are non-
stationary. Maslyuk and Smyth (2008) with weekly data and Ghoshray and Johnson (2010) 
with monthly data permit up to two structural breaks and are unable to reject the null of unit 
root. Mishra and Smyth (2014) report that recognizing heteroskedasticity in addition to two 
structural breaks in daily energy data results in the finding that prices are mean reverting.
9
  
                                                          
7
 Ratti and Vespignani (2013b) attribute the high crude oil prices despite weak global activity after 2009 to 
substantial increases in global liquidity. 
8
 More recently it is recognized that oil price is endogenous and dependent on economic and financial conditions 
worldwide (Kilian; 2009). 
9
 The literature on the time series properties of energy prices in the presence of structural breaks is extensive. 
Using weekly data between 1991 and 1996, and allowing one break in 1994, Gulen (1999) finds non-stationarity 
for several spot prices. Serletis (1992) allows for endogenously determined structural breaks in finding that daily 
energy futures price data are not stationary. In contrast, Lee et al. (2006) allow for two endogenously 
determined structural breaks and a quadratic trend and Lee and Lee (2009) allow for multiple breaks find 
evidence of supportive of stationary real resource price series. Noguera (2013) and Mishra and Smyth (2014) 
provide extensive reviews of the literature on investigations of the time series properties of energy prices. 
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In the oil price literature, different structural breaks have been found, at least in part 
because different time periods have been analysed and different frequency of data utilized. 
For example, using daily data Arouri et al. (2012) finds one structural break in 1997 and 
multiples breaks in 2008 in the gasoline market using data from January 2 1986 to October 
20, 2009. Using monthly data from January 1961 and August 2011, Noguera (2013) found 
several structural breaks: when the data is used in levels a structural break is found for 
January 1978 and for both level and trend he found structural breaks for July 1979, February 
1986, February 1991, July 1998 and November 2008 (during our sample period). The 
important issues of unit root, co-integration and structural breaks in the global oil price data 
are considered in the next section. 
 
4. Methodology 
The methodology of the paper is based on Killian (2009), but with the novelty that 
growth in global oil production is differentiated into growth in OPEC oil production and 
growth in non-OPEC oil production. Consider a SVAR constructed with quarterly data from 
1974:Q1 to 2012:Q4, with the following variables: OPEC oil production      , Non-OPEC 
oil production        , purchase power parity measure of global GDP in U.S dollars 
        and oil prices      . Both, oil prices and global GDP (PPP) in U.S. dollars are 
deflated by the U.S. GDP deflator. 
The SVAR model can expressed as:  
       ∑       
 
                    (1) 
Where j  is the optimal lag length determined by the Schwarz criterion (BC), one lag in this 
case, and t  denotes the vector of serially and mutually uncorrelated structural innovations. 
The vector     can be expressed as: 
   [                                            ]      (2) 
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Contemporaneous restrictions are based on Killian (2009) and are summarised in the 
following equation: 
     [
    
    
          
             
]
[
 
 
 
 
          
           
           
         ]
 
 
 
 
                               (3) 
Equation 4 implies that shocks to both growth in OPEC and growth in non-OPEC oil 
production are assumed to not respond to the other structural shocks within the same quarter. 
This assumption is based Kilian (2009) and supported by the LM ratio of over-identified 
restrictions test, which support zero restrictions for      or     . In Kilian (2009) real oil 
price is in log-level, and aggregate demand and oil production are in percentage changes. 
Growth in global GDP is assumed to respond contemporaneously to growth in both 
oil productions, but not to oil prices. This implies that global production could be affected by, 
for example, an oil production shortage. Nevertheless, growth in global output or growth in 
GDP is expected to respond with some delay to growth in oil prices given that production 
decisions cannot be made in response to short term price fluctuations. Finally, growth in oil 
prices respond contemporaneously to growth in oil productions and growth in global output.  
4.1. Data and variables  
The sample period is from 1974:Q1 to 2012:Q4. The study uses quarterly data so as to 
make use of a broad indicator of global economic activity provided by a proxy for global 
GDP which can be constructed at this frequency.
10
 A proxy variable for global GDP 
        is provided by the aggregated purchase power parity GDP in US dollars for the 
United States,  the European Union countries, Australia, Canada, China, Ireland, Japan, 
                                                          
10
 Finding a good scale variable for global real activity at a frequency greater than quarterly is difficult. In his 
influential contribution to analysis of the global determinants of real oil prices with monthly data, Kilian (2009) 
introduced the dry bulk shipping cost as an indicator of global demand for commodities. Kolodzeij and 
Kaufmann (2014) argue that the connection between dry bulk maritime freight costs and oil prices is due to the 
relationship between oil prices and the cost of transportation. 
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Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway and Turkey.
11
 Oil price       is the spot price of 
Western Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil from the U.S. Department of Energy. These countries 
account for more than 80% of global GDP for most of the data period. The starting date is 
dictated by the availability of oil price data. The OPEC oil production (    ) and non-OPEC 
oil production (     ) data in millions of barrels average pumped per day from U.S. 
Department of Energy. Real variables are nominal variables deflated by the US CPI from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  
4.2. Unit root, co-integration and structural breaks 
4.2.1. Unit root and structural breaks 
We start the analysis of the data by carrying out the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF), 
Dickey Fuller GLS (DF-GLS) and the Phillip-Perron (PP) unit root tests for all variables in 
the model without considering structural breaks. Results are reported in Table 1 and reveal 
that the logs of OPEC oil production, non-OPEC oil production, real global GDP and real oil 
price are first difference stationary. Those results are confirmed by the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test where the inverse null hypothesis is tested. The null hypothesis of 
unit root cannot be rejected even at 10% level for those series in levels but can be rejected at 
1% level of significant for these series in first differences.   
Perron (1989) shows that if there exists a one-time permanent change in the data, the 
ADF test for unit root could be biased towards reducing the ability to reject a false unit root 
null hypothesis. To deal with this issue we carry out Perron (1997)’s unit root test which 
allows identification of a structural break endogenously from the data (the details of this test 
are presented in Appendix A). Results of Perron (1997)’s unit root test are shown in Figure 3. 
This test suggests that the most significant structural break in the data occurs in Q4: 1996. In 
Table 2, results show that the null hypothesis that real oil price has a unit root with a 
                                                          
11
 The quarterly Chinese GDP data are interpolated from annual Chinese purchase power parity GDP in US 
dollars from OECD statistical tables.  
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structural break in both intercept and trend cannot be rejected at 1%. These results confirm 
both Hamilton (2013)’s claims of an important structural break in the oil market in 1997 and 
also that real oil price contain has a unit root even when a structural break is considered.  
Consequently, we considered this result and Hamilton (2013)’s idea that during the 
period of analysis important change in the drivers of oil price occurs in the first quarter of 
1997 as demand for oil by China and India intensifies. We also use the traditional Chow 
(1960) break point test for the points 1979:Q3, 1986:Q1, 1998:Q3 and 2008:Q4 following the 
findings by Noguera (2012) with monthly data, and the point 1997:Q1 indicated by Hamilton 
(2013) and identified out by Perron (1997)’s test. 
We found that at quarterly frequency, the three different versions of the Chow test 
indicate structural change only from 1997:Q1. Specifically, the F-statistic for this test was 
74.52, the Log likelihood ratio 61.52 and the Wald statistics 74.51. Thus the null hypothesis 
of no breaks at this specific breakpoint can be rejected at 1% level, confirming Hamilton’s 
hypothesis.
12
 On the contrary, the null hypothesis of no breaks at this specific breakpoint 
cannot be rejected at 10% level for the other points tested (results available upon request).  
4.2.2 Cointegration 
Saikkonen and Lütkepohl (2000) show that it is possible to account for structural 
breaks in testing for cointegration by developing a maximum likelihood approach allows for 
possible shifts in the mean of the data (see appendix B). Consequently, we test cointegration 
amongst the variables                                 and          using Saikkonen 
and Lütkepohl (2000) in a VAR framework. Results are presented in Tables 3 and 4 for both 
trace statistics and maximum eigenvalue statistics. No evidence of cointegration vectors 
among the variables                                 and          is found.  
 
                                                          
12
 For details about Chow test, please see Chow (1960) and Andrews and Fair (1988). 
 
 
12 
 
5. Empirical results  
Results from estimating the SVAR model in equations (1)-(3) will now be reported. 
By way of introduction, preliminary causality results for growth in OPEC and non-OPEC oil 
production for both “the age of OPEC” and “a new industrial age” are reported. In Table 5 it 
is found that during “the age of OPEC”, growth in non-OPEC oil production Granger causes 
growth in OPEC oil production while growth in OPEC oil production does not Grange cause 
growth in non-OPEC oil production. During the new industrial age, growth in OPEC oil 
production does not Granger cause growth in non-OPEC oil production and growth in non-
OPEC oil production does not Granger cause growth in OPEC oil production. 
5.1. Impulse response function results (full sample model) 
Figure 4 shows the responses of the variables in the SVAR to one-standard deviation 
structural innovations. The SVAR is estimated with data over 1974:Q1-2012:Q4. The dashed 
lines represent a one standard error confidence band around the estimates of the coefficients 
of the impulse response functions.
13
 In the first column are shown the responses of growth in 
OPEC oil production, non-OPEC oil production, global GDP, and real price of oil to a 
structural (positive) innovation in growth in OPEC oil production. The effect of an 
unanticipated supply increase on growth in OPEC oil production is very persistent and highly 
significant. An unanticipated innovation in growth in OPEC oil production does not cause a 
significant effect on growth in global real GDP. An unanticipated positive innovation in 
growth in OPEC oil production causes a significant negative effect on the growth in real price 
of oil that persists in magnitude from the second quarter onwards. 
In the second column of Figure 4 a positive innovation in growth in non-OPEC oil 
production has a statistically significant negative effect on growth in OPEC oil production 
that is very persistent. The implication is that OPEC restricts growth in production when 
                                                          
13
 The confidence bands are obtained using Monte Carlo integration as described by Sims (1980), where 5000 
draws were used from the asymptotic distribution of the VAR coefficient. 
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there is an unexpected increase in growth in non-OPEC oil production. A positive innovation 
in growth in non-OPEC oil production on growth in non-OPEC oil production is very 
persistent and highly significant. A positive shock to growth in non-OPEC oil production 
causes a negative effect on the growth in real price of oil that is only statistically significant 
in the first quarter, after which the absolute magnitude of the effect declines and becomes 
insignificant. 
The effects of positive shocks to growth in global GDP are considered in the third 
column of Figure 4. A positive shock growth in global GDP has a positive effect on growth in 
OPEC oil production that is statistically significant and that grows over time. Eventually 
growth in OPEC oil production responds by a large amount to the growth in global GDP 
shock. A positive growth in global GDP shock has a negative effect on growth in OPEC oil 
production that is not statistically significant (except in the third quarter). An unanticipated 
expansion in growth in global GDP results in a significant increase in growth in real oil price 
that builds up over the first three years and then is sustained at a large value.
14
  
 The effects of an oil market–specific demand shock are shown in column 4 of Figure 
4. In the last row of column 4 a positive shock in oil market-specific demand shock has a 
large and persistent positive effect on the growth in real price of oil. This effect is highly 
statistically significant and rises in magnitude over the first three quarters. A positive oil 
market-specific demand shock is not associated with significant effects on growth in OPEC 
oil production, but is linked with significant increases in growth in non-OPEC oil production. 
A positive oil market-specific demand shock has a negative effect on growth in global GDP. 
The effect is statistically significant in the third quarter. 
5.2. Impulse response function results for 1974:Q1-1996:Q4 and 1997:Q1-2012:Q4  
                                                          
14
 This result is similar to the finding by Kilian (2009) for 1973:1-2007:12 with monthly data in that a positive 
shock to global real aggregate demand for all industrial commodities resulted in a significant oil price increase 
that builds up over the first year and then is sustained at a large value. 
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In Figures 5 and 6 the responses of the variables in the SVAR to one-standard 
deviation structural innovations are shown when the SVAR is estimated with data over 
1974:Q1-1996:Q4 and 1997:Q1-2012:Q4, respectively. The objective is to determine whether 
there has been a change in the responses of growth in OPEC and in non-OPEC oil production 
to each other and to growth in global GDP and to change in real oil price over time. 
5.2.1. “The age of OPEC” 
 In Figure 5 impulse response function results are presented for the SVAR estimated 
1974:Q1-1996:Q4. Overall, the impulse response results for the “age of OPEC” period are 
very similar to those for the overall sample in Figure 4.  The one noticeable difference is that 
an unanticipated increase global GDP growth does not result in a significant effect on the 
change in real oil price for the model estimated over 1974:Q1-1996:Q4. Conversely a 
negative shock to global GDP does not result in a significant change in real oil price over this 
period.  
5.2.2. “A new industrial age” 
In Figure 6 impulse response function results are presented for the SVAR estimated 
over 1997:Q1-2012:Q4. The impulse response results for the “A new industrial age” include 
several changes compared to the results for overall sample in Figure 4. First, OPEC oil 
production growth no longer declines with positive shocks to growth in non-OPEC oil 
production. Second, OPEC oil production growth responses to positive innovations in global 
GDP growth are still significant, but are now much smaller over 1997:Q1-2012:Q4 than for 
the full sample or for the 1974:Q1-1996:Q4 period. Third, OPEC oil production growth now 
rises significantly with an increase in the change in oil prices (this is consistent with 
Hamilton (2009)). Fourth, over 1997:Q1-2012:Q4, change in real oil price continues to 
respond negatively to positive shocks to OPEC oil production growth (the effect is smaller 
and less significant than previously), but change in real oil price now also responds 
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negatively and significantly to positive shocks to non-OPEC oil production growth. Fifth, 
over 1997:Q1-2012:Q4 the negative effect on change in real oil price of positive shocks to 
non-OPEC oil production growth is larger in absolute value than that of positive shocks to 
OPEC oil production growth. Sixth, non-OPEC oil production growth does not respond 
significantly to positive innovations in change in real oil price over 1997:Q1-2012:Q4.  
5.3. Historical decomposition of real oil price 
The cumulative contribution to the change in real price of oil of the structural shocks 
to growth in OPEC oil production and growth in non-OPEC oil production are reported in 
Figure 7a, from estimating the SVAR model in equations (1)-(3). The cumulative 
contributions of structural shocks to real oil price in Figure 7a are three year annual averages 
to improve the readability of the plot. In Figure 7a the cumulative contribution to real oil 
price of shocks to growth in non-OPEC oil production are comparatively small compared to 
the cumulative contribution to real oil price of shocks to growth in OPEC oil production.  
A striking observation in Figure 7a is that from 1981 to 1986 growth in OPEC oil 
production makes the greatest cumulative contribution to real oil price over the whole period. 
This is because OPEC oil production fell from levels over 25 million barrels a day in monthly 
data for several years leading up to August 1980, to levels barely above 13 million barrels a 
day in monthly data from February 1983 to June 1985.
15
 This huge reduction in OPEC oil 
production in the early 1980s, due to revolution/wars and decisions on oil production by 
Saudi Arabia, means that even though real oil price fell over the period, the fall would have 
been even greater if the fall in OPEC production had not occurred. This is reflected in large 
positive cumulative contribution to real oil price by shocks to growth in OPEC oil production 
in the early 1980s. 
                                                          
15
 In monthly data, OPEC oil production peaked in December 1976 at 33.1 million barrels a day. Production 
then never fell below 25 million barrels a day in monthly data up August 1980. Production was 30.4 million 
barrels a day in July 1979. 
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During the late 1980s and early 1990s OPEC oil production increases and non-OPEC 
oil production falls.
16
 This is reflected in Figure 7a by a positive cumulative contribution to 
real oil price of shocks by growth in non-OPEC oil production and negative cumulative 
contribution to real oil price of shocks by growth in OPEC oil production over 1987 to 1991. 
Thereafter, the largest cumulative contributions to real oil price of shocks from growth in oil 
production are by growth in OPEC oil production over 1999-2002 (positive), 2005 (negative) 
and 2009-2012 (negative). 
17
 
The cumulative contributions to growth in OPEC oil production and to growth in non-
OPEC oil production of shocks to the real price are reported in Figure 7b. In Figure 7b the 
cumulative contribution to growth in non-OPEC oil production of shocks to the real price are 
small. The cumulative contribution to growth in OPEC oil production of real price shocks is 
large in Figure 7b. Increases real oil price are associated with positive cumulative 
contribution to growth in OPEC oil production over 1977-1981, 1989-1990, 1997, 2001-
2002, 2005-2008 and 2012. Decreases real oil price are associated with negative cumulative 
contribution to growth in OPEC oil production over 1983-1988, 1994, 1998, 2003 and 2009. 
Despite dramatic increases in the real price of oil over the 2002 to 2008 period, growth in 
non-OPEC oil production didn’t respond in the short-run.18  
The cumulative contributions to growth in OPEC oil production of shocks to growth 
in non-OPEC oil production and the reverse are reported in Figure 7c. A conspicuous result 
in Figure 7c is that there is a large cumulative contribution to growth in OPEC oil production 
of shocks to growth in non-OPEC oil production, but that the reverse does not hold. It is also 
                                                          
16
 In monthly data, non-OPEC oil production peaked (up until that point) in May 1988 at 39.6 million barrels a 
day. Production then fell for several years, with a local minimum of 35.0 million barrels a day in September 
1993. This fall in non-OPEC oil production is driven by the dramatic decline in Russian production oil 
production. 
17
 Over 1998 to mid-2003 OPEC oil production goes up and down around the 28 million barrels a day mark. 
OPEC oil production has local maxima in September 2005, July 2008 and April 2012, and a local minimum in 
February 2007. 
18
 From 1974 to 1978, the world crude oil price is in a period of moderate decline. During this period OPEC 
production was relatively flat near 30 million barrels per day. Production was 30.4 million barrels a day in July 
1979. 
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apparent that the effect of shocks to growth in non-OPEC oil production on cumulative 
growth in OPEC oil production is larger in the first half of the sample than in the second half 
of the sample. Non-OPEC oil production is generally rising from 1974 to the mid-1980s, is 
largely flat running in the region of 38 million barrels a day from 1984 to 1988, after which 
point production falls until late-1993 (a local minimum of 35.0 million barrels a day in 
September 1993 monthly data). The 1984 to 1993 period of flat and falling non-OPEC oil 
production is associated with positive cumulative growth in OPEC oil production. From late 
1993 non-OPEC production generally gradually rose to 42.6 million barrels a day in May 
2005, after which point non-OPEC production flat lined with fluctuations usually above 40.0 
above million barrels a day.  
In summary, in terms of cumulative effects of structural shocks, growth in non-OPEC 
production influences growth in OPEC production, real oil price influences growth in OPEC 
production and growth in OPEC production influences real oil price. The cumulative effect of 
structural shocks to growth in OPEC production and real oil price on growth in non-OPEC 
production is relatively small. 
5.4. Variance decomposition analysis  
5.4.1. Decomposition of OPEC and non-OPEC production,  
The forecast error variance decompositions (FEVDs) of OPEC and non-OPEC 
production are reported in Table 6 from the estimation of the structural VAR model in 
Equations (1), (2) and (3). Decompositions of the forecast error variance provide insight on 
the percent contribution of structural shocks in the global oil market on growth in OPEC and 
non-OPEC production. FEVDs are reported for 1974:Q1-1996:Q4 and 1997:Q1-2012:Q4.  
At one year horizon, oil market-specific demand shock forecasts 2.08% of variation in 
growth in OPEC oil production during 1974:Q1-1996:Q4 and a statistically significant 
21.18% during 1997:Q1-2012:Q4. Growth in global GDP shocks project 6.01% of variation 
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in growth in OPEC oil production during 1974:Q1-1996:Q4 and only 5.72% during 1997:Q1-
2012:Q4. 
Growth in non-OPEC oil production forecasts a statistically significant 12.92% of 
variation in growth in OPEC oil production during 1974:Q1-1996:Q4 and only 0.22% during 
1997:Q1-2012:Q4. The forecast error variance decompositions results confirm that growth in 
OPEC oil production is much more influenced by change in real oil price during 1997:Q1-
2012:Q4 than during 1974:Q1-1996:Q4, and more responsive to growth in non-OPEC 
production during 1974:Q1-1996:Q4 than during 1997:Q1-2012:Q4. 
5.4.2. Contributions to global GDP and oil prices: “The age of OPEC” and “A new 
industrial age” 
 Table 7 reports the forecast error variance decompositions of growth global GDP and 
change in oil prices in 1974:Q1-1996:Q4 and 1997:Q1-2012:Q4. During 1997:Q1-2012:Q4, 
growth OPEC oil production and in non-OPEC oil production forecast 6.02% and 6.54% of 
the variation in growth in oil price at the one year horizon, respectively. Over 1974:Q1-
1996:Q4, the ability of growth in OPEC oil production and in non-OPEC oil production to 
forecast oil price captured by oil market-specific demand is much smaller. During 1997:Q1-
2012:Q4 at the one year horizon growth in non-OPEC oil production forecasts 3.91% of the 
variation in growth in global GDP, and during 1974:Q1-1996:Q4 OPEC oil production 
forecast 2.56% of the variation in growth in global GDP. 
 
6. Robustness analysis and alternative specifications 
In this section, we examine the robustness of our model to: different identifications 
strategies, different measure of oil prices and lag structure in the VAR model. 
6.1. Identification   
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The decomposition of oil production in OPEC and non-OPEC production has been 
studied in a macroeconomic model in equation (3) that follows Kilian’s (2009) VAR analysis 
of the determinants of real oil price, but with growth in oil production differentiated into 
growth in OPEC oil production and growth in non-OPEC oil production. In equation (3) 
growth in OPEC oil production and growth non-OPEC oil production do not depend 
contemporaneously on each other. We now explore two of alternative contemporaneous 
restrictions for these variables. The alternative contemporaneous restrictions (analysed in turn 
in conjunction with equations (1) and (2)) are presented in equations (4) and (5):  
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In equation (4) we allow growth in OPEC oil production to depend 
contemporaneously on growth in non-OPEC oil production, and in equation (5) growth in 
non-OPEC oil production depends contemporaneously on growth in OPEC oil production. 
Both new specifications yield similar results to those results obtained in Figures 4, 5 and 6.  
6.2. Nominal global GDP and nominal oil prices 
  We also specified the model using nominal global GDP and nominal oil prices. We 
observe that general results hold in terms of sign and statistical significance, while responses 
are somewhat larger. We also note some difference in the variance decomposition results for 
the nominal model. These results are reported in Tables 8 and 9. The main differences 
between the real and nominal can be seen by comparing Table 6 with Table 8 and Table 9 
with 6.  
 
 
20 
 
The forecast error variance decompositions of growth in OPEC and non-OPEC 
production with nominal variables are reported in Table 9. A main difference in results is that 
greater fractions of growth in OPEC oil production are predicted by growth in nominal GDP 
than by growth in real GDP in both periods (and especially during 1997:Q1-2012:Q4 when 
the fraction predicted by growth in nominal GDP is 19.94%). However, the finding earlier 
that growth in non-OPEC production forecasts growth in OPEC production during 1974:Q1-
1996:Q4 is robust to this change in model specification. 
6.3. Lags structures in the SVAR model 
We check the sensitivity of our results to the lag selection strategy. The Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) is also widely used in time series analysis when a longer 
structure is preferred; in our model this criterion selected two lags (or six months). We re-
estimated the model with two lags and we find that results are very similar to those already 
estimated, although the error bands in the impulse response function slightly increase. 
6.4. The Global and Asian Financial Crises 
The Global Financial Crisis was associated with dramatic changes in commodity 
prices and the behaviour of key macroeconomic variables. Perri and Quadrini (2011), for 
example document unprecedented business cycle synchronization among the developed 
countries during the last two quarters of 2008. The authors argue that this is due to the fact 
that in the last two quarters of 2008, GDP declined by a substantial amount in all G7 
countries. To correspond to this analysis, we introduce a dummy variable that takes the value 
1 in Q3 and Q4 2008 and 0 otherwise into equations (1) to (3). Results are essentially 
unchanged from those in Figures 5 and 6 from following this strategy for dealing with the 
global financial crisis (and are available from the authors). 
Some authors have attributed a structural break in the oil market to the Asian 
Financial Crisis. Arouri et al. (2012) argue that as consequence of the Asian economic and 
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financial crisis a possible structural break occurred in 1997 in the oil market. Maslyuk and 
Smyth (2008) also claim that the most significant events around the period 1997-1998 that 
could disrupt the oil market have been the Asian financial crisis and Russian default. These 
factors may indeed reinforce the finding of a break between the two periods identified by 
Hamilton (2013) as “The age of OPEC”, 1973-1996, and “A new industrial age”, 1997-
present. Radelet and Sachs (1998) identify recognition of the start of the Asian Financial 
Crisis with the sharp devaluation of the Thai Baht on 2 July 1997, but note that underlying 
problems predate this event. As observed earlier, we identify the structural break in the oil 
market as occurring in 1996Q4 in line with the Perron (1997) test result.  
  
7. Predicting growth in OPEC and non-OPEC oil production and real oil prices 
In this section we use we use recent developed econometric techniques to estimate 
whether or not it is possible to infer the predictability of growth in OPEC oil production, non-
OPEC oil production and real oil prices using the variables in the previous sections for the 
periods of interest 1974:Q1-1996:Q4 and 1997:Q1-2012:Q4. This will provide a further test 
of the robustness of the results obtained from SVAR analysis. A potential problem with 
prediction of OPEC or of non-OPEC oil production is that innovations in the prediction 
variables are correlated with the variables being predicted. An additional potential problem is 
that growth in oil production is heteroskedastic, making it challenging to assess the value of 
information coming from the predictors. For these reasons we employ an OLS bias-adjusted 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors and covariance technique due to Lewellen 
(2004), Westerlund and Narayan (2012) and Narayan et al. (2014) to predict OPEC and non-
OPEC oil production. Fan and Yao (2003) provide a detailed discussion of techniques for 
forecasting when innovations in the prediction variables are correlated with the variables 
being predicted and there is heteroskedasticity.  
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7.1. Econometric framework 
Consider the following extension of Lewellen (2004) applied to OPEC oil 
production:
19
 
                                                          .               (6) 
Equation (6) states that growth in OPEC oil production    periods ahead can be predicted by 
contemporaneous growth in non-OPEC oil production, growth in global GDP and growth in 
oil prices. In this model we are testing the null hypothesis that either          or    , 
to test whatever or not growth in non-OPEC oil production, growth in global GDP and or 
growth in oil prices, respectively, have any significant predictive power for growth 
in      . A possible shortcoming of this predicting regression is that if growth in      , 
in       or in     are endogenous then their coefficients will be biased. Now, consider the 
following version of autoregressive processes for growth in      , growth in      , and 
growth in    : 
                                               ,                    (7) 
                                               ,                       (8) 
                                       ,                                     (9)  
where:| |   . To avoid the endogeneity problem that biases estimates of the coefficients 
    and  , Lewellen (2004) proposes a regression  to capture the possible endogenous effect 
by assuming the following relationship: 
                                                         ,                                     (10) 
where     and                          have a mean of zero and     is not correlated with either 
                 or      . An extended version of Lewellen’s (2004) methodology can be 
inferred by making equation (6) conditional to equation (10). The equation can be writing as: 
                                                          
19
 Note that all variables are only first difference stationary and therefore changes in logs transformation have 
been applied. 
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                                       (11) 
Because   is unknown, equation (11) cannot be estimated. To solve this issue 
Lewellen (2004) assumes that the unknown  =0.999.20 Given that the value of ρ can be taken 
as a given (by assumption) equation (11) can be estimated as: 
                                                         
                                                                    
                                                                                                                               (12) 
In equation (12) we have                                           
and   is a constant. Accordingly,               are the bias-adjusted predictor coefficients of 
growth in                  , respectively. Making equation (6) conditional to equation 
(10) the correlations among     and                   and       can be accounted for. 
Analogues to equation (12), equations (13) and (14) can be used to estimate the 
predictability power of growth OPEC oil production, growth in global GDP and growth in 
real oil price on growth in non-OPEC oil production, and the predictability power of growth 
in OPEC oil production, growth non-OPEC oil production and growth in global GDP on 
growth in real oil prices. The prediction equations for growth in non-OPEC oil production 
and growth in real oil price are given by 
                                                        
                                                                    
                                                                  (13)            
                                                          
20
 Note that Westerlund and Narayan (2012) and Narayan et al. (2014) provide an alternative assumption for  , 
that      
 
 
, where     is a drift parameter that measures the degree of persistency in the predictor 
variable and T is the number of observations.  
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and                                                                  
                                                        
                                                        
                                                             (14)      
7.2. Results  
In Tables 10, 11 and 12, the bias-adjusted OLS heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
error results are reported from estimating equations (12) ,(13) and (14), respectively. In the 
Tables results are presented for 1974:Q1 to 1996:Q4 in columns 1, 3 and 5 with different 
setting values of   . In columns 2, 4 and 6 the same estimation is presented, but for the period 
1997:Q1 to 2012:Q4. In columns 1 and 2 we follow Lewellen (2004) in setting        . 
We also report results following Westerlund and Narayan (2012) and Narayan et al. (2014) in 
setting    
 
 
 . In columns 3 and 4,    , and in columns 5 and 7,     .  
7.2.1. Predicting growth in OPEC oil production 
In Table 10, we report results for the estimation of growth in OPEC oil production in 
equation (12). During the period 1974:Q1 to 1996:Q4, estimates of the coefficient      are 
statistically significant from zero at the 5% level for all three assumptions for ρ. The point 
estimates suggest that a 1% point increase in growth in non-OPEC oil production is 
associated with a reduction of about 1.6% points in growth in OPEC oil production. Given 
that during 1974:Q1 to 1996:Q4 non-OPEC oil production is about 50% greater than OPEC 
oil production, the point estimate of     suggests a fall in production by OPEC (compared to 
where it would have been) that is approximately equal to the increase in production by non-
OPEC (compared to where it would have been). For the period 1996:Q1 to 2012:Q4, growth 
in OPEC oil production does not significantly respond to growth in non-OPEC oil 
production. 
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During the period 1974:Q1 to 1996:Q4, an increase in growth in global real GDP has 
a statistically significant effect at 1% level on growth in OPEC oil production. From 1996:Q1 
to 2012:Q4, growth in OPEC oil production responds significantly to increase in growth in 
global real GDP at the 5% or 10% levels, depending on the assumption made about ρ. 
However, there is a substantial reduction in magnitude of the estimated effect of growth in 
global real GDP on growth in OPEC oil production for the period 1996:Q1 to 2012:Q4 
compared to the period 1974:Q1 to 1996:Q4. 
For the period 1996:Q1 to 2012:Q4, growth in OPEC oil production responds 
significantly to  growth in real oil prices, but does not do so during 1974:Q1 to 1996:Q4. 
Estimates of    indicate that a 1% point rise in growth real oil price leads to an increase in 
growth in OPEC oil production of around 0.05% points during 1996:Q1 to 2012:Q4. These 
forecast results confirm that the findings for the early period, 1974:Q1 to 1996:Q4, that 
growth in OPEC oil production responds to growth in non-OPEC oil production but not to 
growth in real oil price, are reversed for the later period 1996:Q1 to 2012:Q4. 
7.2.2. Predicting growth in non-OPEC oil production 
We now turn to the estimation of equation (13), where growth in non-OPEC oil 
production is the dependant variable. In Table 11, the only adjusted-bias predictor coefficient 
which is statistically significant is   , indicating that a 1% point increase in real oil prices is 
associated with about a 0.02% point rise in growth in non-OPEC oil production. For the 
period 1996:Q1 to 2012:Q4, no predictor coefficients are statistically significant at 
conventional levels. Dées et al. (2007) note that non-OPEC oil production is limited by 
geological and institutional conditions, with the implication that growth in non-OPEC oil 
production is not responsive in the short-run to the variables growth in global real GDP, 
growth in OPEC oil production and growth in real oil price. 
7.2.3. Predicting growth in real oil price 
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In Table 12, we report results for the estimation on equation (14), where growth in 
real oil price is predicted. Consistent, with Hamilton (2011)’s view, there are remarkable 
changes between the two periods in terms of the variables that have predictive power for 
growth in real oil price. During the period 1974:Q1 to 1996:Q4 only growth in OPEC oil 
production is statistically significant in explaining growth in real oil prices (indicated by 
statistical significance of the coefficient   ). For the period 1996:Q1 to 2012:Q4 only growth 
in real global GDP is statistically significant in explaining real oil prices (reflected by 
statistical significance of   ). 
 
8. Discussion and Conclusion  
Hamilton identifies 1973 to 1996 as “the age of OPEC” and 1997 to the present as “a 
new industrial age.” The impulse response results for the “A new industrial age” suggest a 
number of changes compared to the results for “the age of OPEC”. First, growth in OPEC oil 
production decreases significantly with positive shocks to growth in non-OPEC oil 
production in the earlier period, but does not do so in the “new industrial age”. In the “new 
industrial age” growth in OPEC oil production rises significantly with an increase in oil 
prices, unlike during “the age of OPEC” period. Growth in OPEC oil production response to 
positive innovation in growth in global GDP is statistically significant but much smaller over 
1997:Q1-2012:Q4 than over the 1974:Q1-1996:Q4 period. During 1997:Q1-2012:Q4 the 
negative effect on change in real oil price of positive shocks to growth in non-OPEC oil 
production is larger in absolute value than that of positive shocks to growth in OPEC oil 
production. 
Structural shocks to growth in non-OPEC oil production make a large cumulative 
contribution to growth in OPEC oil production. The reverse does not hold. The effect of 
shocks to growth in non-OPEC oil production on cumulative growth in OPEC oil production 
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is larger over 1974-1996 than over 1997-2012. Shocks to growth in OPEC oil production 
make large cumulative contribution to change in real oil price and vice versa. Shocks to 
growth in non-OPEC oil production do not make a large cumulative contribution to change in 
real oil price and vice versa. 
Results are consistent with important changes in the global oil market. Strong global 
demand has maintained real oil price at high levels over most of 1997:Q1-2012:Q4.  There 
has been a major change in the behaviour of OPEC from reacting to non-OPEC oil 
production from 1974 to 1996 and to responding to higher real oil price from 1997 to 2012. 
Consistent with results from the SVAR analysis, use of a new econometric prediction 
technique suggests that during the “the age of OPEC”, growth in OPEC oil production can be 
predicted by growth in non-OPEC oil production and growth in global economic growth, and 
that during the “new industrial age” period, growth in OPEC oil production can be predicted 
by change in real oil prices and growth in global GDP. These finding suggest a more market-
oriented oil production strategy by OPEC since 1997. 
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Appendix A 
Perron (1997) extends the dickey-fuller’s unit root test by using the following set of 
regression equations: 
                           ∑           
 
                     (A.1) 
                                ∑           
 
        (A.2) 
Where            and               being the indicator function,    
        . In equation (A.2), both a change in the intercept and slope are allowed at time   . 
The test is performed using the t-statistics for the null hypothesis that     in (A.2). 
   
                                                                         (A.3) 
            
    ̂                                                               (A.4) 
  ̂    ̂    ∑     ̂      
 
                                                        (A.5) 
Where   ̂                   the t-statistics for testing     under model I with break date 
   and truncation lag parameter k (using regression (A.1), (A.2) and (A.4) for       , 
respectively, where    and k are treated as unknown). 
Under (A.4), a change in the slope is allowed but both segments of the trend function 
are joined at the time break. Following two-step procedure, the series is detrended using the 
regression (A.3). The test is then carried out using the t-statistics for     in regression 
(A.5). Finally,    is selected endogenously by choosing the statistics as   
      
               ̂                   
 
Appendix B 
Following Saikkonen and Lütkepohl (2000) assume that an observed n-dimensional 
time series                 where            is generating by: 
                                                                                           (B.1) 
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                                          {
          
         
                                                              (B.2) 
                                            {
          
         
                                                             (B.3) 
In (B.1)    and     (       ) are unknown (       parameter vectors,     is an 
impulse dummy variable and     is a shift dummy that account for the presence of structural 
breaks. Following this procedure, Saikkonen and Lütkepohl (2000) shown that the VAR 
Johansen system of cointegration vector can be used to test for cointegration in presence of a 
structural break (for more detail see for example Saikkonen and Lütkepohl (2000)). For this 
test we use 4 lags (1 year) which coincides with lags selection of the Schwartz Bayesian 
information criterion and intercept and trend following Saikkonen and Lütkepohl (2000).    
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Table 1: Test for unit roots 1974:Q1-2012:Q4  
Level ADF KPSS First difference ADF KPSS 
log (OOPt) -1.35 0.64** ∆log (OOPt) -10.73*** 0.24 
log (NOOPt) -2.52 1.14*** ∆log (NOOPt) 3.13** 0.43 
log (GGDPt) -1.47 1.54*** ∆log (GGDPt) -6.53*** 0.34 
log (OPt) -0.78 0.80*** ∆log (OPt) -10.14 0.11 
Notes: The null hypothesis for the ADF test is the variable has a unit root and the null hypothesis for the KPSS test is the 
variable is stationary. The first difference of the series is indicated by ∆.The lag selection criteria for the ADF is based on 
Schwarz information Criteria (SIC) and for the KPSS is the Newey-West Bandwidth. ***, **, * indicates rejection of the 
null hypothesis at 1%, 5% and 10%, levels of significance. 
 
Table 2: Perron (1997)’s unit root test with structural break 
Null Hypothesis: log of real oil prices has a unit root with a structural break in 
intercept and trend 
Perron 1997 unit root test -3.58 
1% critical value -6.32 
5% critical value -5.59 
10% critical value -5.29 
 
Table 3 Saikkonen and Lütkepohl cointegration tests (with breaks) 1974:Q1-2012:Q4  
             Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue 
Trace 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical Value Prob.** 
None  0.150  46.525  47.856  0.066 
At most 1  0.096  21.877  29.797  0.305 
At most 2  0.030  6.627  15.497  0.621 
At most 3  0.012  1.931  3.841  0.164 
  
Table 4 Saikkonen and Lütkepohl cointegration tests (with breaks) 1974:Q1-2012:Q4    
    Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)) 
Hypothesized 
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue 
Trace 
Statistic 
0.05 
Critical Value Prob.** 
None  0.150  24.647  27.584  0.113 
At most 1  0.096  15.250  21.131  0.271 
At most 2  0.030  4.695  14.264  0.779 
At most 3  0.012  1.931  3.841  0.164 
Trace test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
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Table 5: Causality test of growth in OPEC and non-OPEC oil production 
Null Hypothesis: x does not Granger cause y 
 
The Age of OPEC 
(1974-1996) 
The new industrial age 
(1997-2012) 
Granger test/Lags 1 4 1 4 
∆log (OOPt)  does not granger cause  ∆log (NOOPt) 0.01 0.52 0.031 2.05 
 ∆log (NOOPt) does not granger cause ∆log (OOPt) 15.22*** 2.76** 0.001 1.30 
Notes: Variables are in logs. *** Indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at 1% level of significance. 
 
 
Table 6: Variance decomposition of growth in OPEC and non-OPEC oil production 
OPEC oil production 
Age of OPEC (1974-1996) New industrial age (1997-2012) 
Quarters OPEC 
Non-
OPEC 
Global 
GDP 
Oil 
prices 
Quarters OPEC 
Non-
OPEC 
Global 
GDP 
Oil 
prices 
2 81.60 13.40 4.11 0.90 2 81.21 0.07 1.17 17.53 
4 78.94 12.96 6.01 2.08 4 72.86 0.22 5.72 21.18 
8 78.72 12.92 6.26 2.08 8 72.71 0.23 5.93 21.13 
 
Non-OPEC oil production 
Age of OPEC (1973-1996) New industrial age (1997-2012) 
Quarters OPEC 
Non-
OPEC 
Global 
GDP 
Oil 
prices 
Quarters OPEC 
Non-
OPEC 
Global 
GDP 
Oil 
prices 
2 7.10 86.81 0.10 5.97 2 0.39 97.09 2.23 0.27 
4 7.04 85.44 1.42 6.08 4 0.42 93.92 2.26 0.40 
8 7.03 85.12 1.76 6.07 8 0.42 96.90 2.27 0.40 
 
Table 7: Contribution of growth in OPEC and non-OPEC oil production after 4 lags (1 year) 
to growth in global GDP and oil prices  
 Global GDP  Oil Prices 
 
Age of OPEC 
(1973-1996) 
New industrial age 
(1997-2012) 
 
Age of OPEC 
(1973-1996) 
New industrial age 
(1997-2012) 
Quarters OPEC 
Non-
OPEC 
OPEC 
Non-
OPEC 
Quarters OPEC 
Non-
OPEC 
OPEC 
Non-
OPEC 
2 2.20 0.19 0.00 3.95 2 2.65 0.08 4.83 6.71 
4 2.54 0.19 0.11 3.91 4 2.65 0.18 6.02 6.54 
8 2.56 0.19 0.11 3.91 8 2.65 0.18 6.02 6.53 
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Table 8: Variance decomposition of growth in OPEC and non-OPEC oil production (nominal 
model) 
OPEC oil production 
 Age of OPEC (1974-1996)  New industrial age (1997-2012) 
Quarters OPEC 
Non-
OPEC 
Global 
GDP 
Oil 
prices 
Quarters OPEC 
Non-
OPEC 
Global 
GDP 
Oil 
prices 
2 77.44 13.19 9.36 0.00 2 81.45 0.00 11.14 7.40 
4 76.15 13.13 9.82 0.90 4 74.48 0.11 17.50 7.88 
8 76.15 13.13 9.82 0.90 8 74.10 0.10 17.94 7.83 
 
Non-OPEC oil production 
 Age of OPEC (1973-1996)  New industrial age (1997-2012) 
Quarters OPEC 
Non-
OPEC 
Global 
GDP 
Oil 
prices 
Quarters OPEC 
Non-
OPEC 
Global 
GDP 
Oil 
prices 
2 8.54 86.97 0.69 3.80 2 0.25 98.73 0.00 1.01 
4 8.50 85.98 1.61 3.90 4 0.30 98.38 0.23 1.04 
8 8.49 85.95 1.64 3.90 8 0.31 98.36 0.28 1.04 
*Note that in this Table global GDP and oil prices are in nominal terms 
 
 
Table 9: Contribution of growth in OPEC and non-OPEC oil production after 4 lags (1 year) 
to growth in global GDP and oil prices (nominal model) 
 Global nominal GDP  Oil Prices (nominal) 
 
Age of OPEC 
(1973-1996) 
New industrial age 
(1997-2012) 
 
Age of OPEC 
(1973-1996) 
New industrial age 
(1997-2012) 
Quarters OPEC 
Non-
OPEC 
OPEC 
Non-
OPEC 
Quarters OPEC 
Non-
OPEC 
OPEC 
Non-
OPEC 
2 4.63 1.64 1.75 0.46 2 4.47 0.10 4.79 5.68 
4 4.83 1.61 3.20 0.40 4 4.46 0.35 5.74 5.60 
8 4.84 1.61 3.35 0.39 8 4.45 0.35 5.74 5.61 
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Table 10: Forecasts of growth in OPEC oil production. Results of OLS bias-adjusted 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors and covariance under different   values and h = 
1. 
 Dependant variable: growth in OPEC oil production 
                 
  
 
 
 1974-1996 1997-2012 1974-1996 1997-2012 1974-1996 1997-2012 
 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
  
-0.031*** 
(0.011) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.031*** 
(0.009) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.031*** 
(0.009) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
   
-1.652** 
(0.715) 
0.237 
(0.377) 
-1.651** 
(0.655) 
0.238 
(0.426) 
-1.678** 
(0.648) 
0.236 
(0.421) 
   
1.372** 
(0.556) 
0.051 
(0.250) 
1.372*** 
(0.517) 
0.051 
(0.280) 
1.372*** 
(0.517) 
0.051 
(0.282) 
   
5.051*** 
(1.368) 
1.023* 
(0.525) 
5.060*** 
(1.337) 
1.023** 
(0.486) 
5.026*** 
(1.327) 
1.018** 
(0.488) 
   
1.697 
(1.305) 
0.234 
(0.654) 
1.697 
(1.175) 
0.234 
(0.701) 
1.697 
(1.175) 
0.234 
(0.701) 
   
-0.074 
(0.062) 
0.047** 
(0.023) 
-0.075 
(0.047) 
0.047** 
(0.021) 
-0.073 
(0.046) 
0.047** 
(0.021) 
   
-0.068 
(0.049) 
0.003 
(0.018) 
-0.068 
(0.046) 
0.003 
(0.022) 
-0.068 
(0.046) 
0.003 
(0.023) 
   0.35 0.28 0.35 0.28 0.35 0.28 
       0.30 0.21 0.30 0.21 0.30 0.21 
F-stat. 7.45 3.77 7.45 3.77 7.45 3.77 
n 90 64 90 64 90 64 
***, **, *, indicates coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Lag order was 
selected by Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC). Standard errors are given in parenthesis. Results are robust 
when a dummy variable accounting for the global financial crisis (GFC) is introduced for the third and fourth 
quarters of 2008, in line with Perri and Quadrini (2011) identification of this crisis. 
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Table 11: Forecasts of growth in non-OPEC oil production. Results of OLS bias-adjusted 
heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors and covariance under different ρ values and h=1. 
 Dependant variable: growth in non-OPEC oil production 
                 
  
 
 
 1974-1996 1997-2012 1974-1996 1997-2012 1974-1996 1997-2012 
 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
  
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
   
0.036 
(0.025) 
0.007 
(0.089) 
0.036 
(0.024) 
0.007 
(0.089) 
0.035 
(0.024) 
0.236 
(0.421) 
   
0.027* 
(0.015) 
0.011 
(0.079) 
0.026* 
(0.015) 
0.011 
(0.079) 
0.026* 
(0.015) 
0.051 
(0.282) 
   
0.329 
(0.280) 
0.198 
(0.224) 
0.329 
(0.281) 
0.198 
(0.229) 
0.329 
(0.281) 
0.197 
(0.225) 
   
0.329 
(0.269) 
0.074 
(0.313) 
0.328 
(0.268) 
0.075 
(0.314) 
0.328 
(0.269) 
0.075 
(0.315) 
   
0.020* 
(0.012) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.021* 
(0.013) 
0.001* 
(0.000) 
0.021* 
(0.012) 
0.001* 
(0.000) 
   
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.016* 
(0.008) 
0.000 
(0.009) 
0.017* 
(0.008) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.016* 
(0.007) 
   0.10 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.07 
       0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 
F-stat. 1.64 0.7 1.64 0.7 1.64 0.7 
n 90 64 90 64 90 64 
***, **, *, indicates coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Lag order was 
selected by Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC). Standard errors are given in parenthesis. Results are robust 
when a dummy variable accounting for the global financial crisis (GFC) is introduced for the third and fourth 
quarters of 2008, in line with Perri and Quadrini (2011) identification of this crisis. 
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Table 12: Forecasts of real oil price. Results of OLS bias-adjusted heteroskedasticity 
consistent standard errors and covariance under different   values and h = 1. 
 Dependant variable: growth in real oil price 
                 
  
 
 
 1974-1996 1997-2012 1974-1996 1997-2012 1974-1996 1997-2012 
 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
  
-0.020 
(0.028) 
-0.020 
(0.020) 
-0.021 
(0.028) 
-0.020 
(0.030) 
-0.020 
(0.028) 
-0.020 
(0.027) 
   
-0.528 
(1.894) 
-2.410 
(2.414) 
-0.527 
(1.894) 
-2.413 
(2.416) 
-0.546 
(1.880) 
-2.352 
(2.390) 
   
0.929 
(1.181) 
-3.074* 
(1.769) 
0.929 
(1.180) 
-3.074* 
(1.769) 
0.930 
(1.181) 
-3.074* 
(1.769) 
   
3.904 
(3.682) 
10.342*** 
(3.970) 
3.902 
(3.683) 
10.357*** 
(3.950) 
3.933 
(3.659) 
10.008*** 
(3.890) 
   
-1.522 
(2.340) 
17.442*** 
(6.208) 
-1.522 
(2.340) 
17.442*** 
(6.208) 
-1.521 
(2.340) 
17.442*** 
(6.208) 
   
-0.688* 
(0.376) 
-0.358 
(1.191) 
-0.689* 
(0.377) 
-0.358 
(1.192) 
-0.681* 
(0.373) 
-0.372 
(1.175) 
   
-0.387 
(0.271) 
0.748 
(1.144) 
-0.387 
(0.271) 
0.747 
(1.144) 
-0.387 
(0.271) 
0.748 
(1.144) 
   0.07 0.36 0.07 0.36 0.07 0.36 
F-stat. 1.00 5.44 1.00 5.44 1.00 5.44 
n 90 64 90 64 90 64 
***, **, *, indicates coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Lag order was 
selected by Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC). Standard errors are given in parenthesis. Results are robust 
when a dummy variable accounting for the global financial crisis (GFC) is introduced for the third and fourth 
quarters of 2008, in line with Perri and Quadrini (2011) identification of this crisis. 
 
Figure 1a: Oil production for OPEC and non-OPEC countries (quarterly data):1974:Q1 to 
2012:Q4 
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Figure 1b: Oil production for Saudi Arabia and for OPEC minus Saudi Arabia (quarterly 
data):1974:Q1 to 2012:Q4. 
 
Notes: Oil production in log of millions of barrels 
 
Figure 2 Nominal and real oil prices index 1974 Q1=100 
 
Notes: Nominal oil price is US dollar index. Real oil price is nominal oil price divided by US CPI index. 
 
Figure 3 Perron 1997 Break point and unit root test   
 
 
7.5
8
8.5
9
9.5
10
10.5
1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010
Saudia Arabia Rest of OPEC
50
70
90
110
130
150
170
190
210
1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010
Nominal oil prices index
Real oil prices index
-3.6
-3.2
-2.8
-2.4
-2.0
-1.6
-1.2
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
PERRON BREAKPOINTS
 
 
40 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The impulse response effects of the structural shocks: 1974:Q1-2012:Q4 
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Figure 5. The impulse response effects of the structural shocks during the age of OPEC 1974:Q1-
1996:Q4 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. The impulse response effects of the structural shocks during the new industrial age 
1997:Q1-2012:Q4 
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Figure 7a: Cumulative effect of structural shocks on real price of oil 
 
 
Figure 7b: Cumulative effect of structural shocks to real oil price on growth in OPEC oil production 
and non-OPEC oil production. 
 
 
Figure 7c: Cumulative effect of structural shocks on growth in OPEC oil production by growth in 
non-OPEC oil production and the reverse. 
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